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Innovation is the major instigator in competitive industry. The competition for innovation is traditionally 
analyzed within the framework of deterministic and stochastic models (Reinganum, 1989). Boone 
(2001), Fethke and Birch (1982) have respectively analyzed the standard models of competitive 
strategies in a duopoly and oligopoly industry. By focusing our analysis on deterministic models that is, 
the models without technological uncertainty, this paper attempts to interpret the model of Boone (2001) 
in order to determine the choice of positioning in a context of cumulative innovation. Thus, taking into 
account the case of the telecommunications’ sector in Senegal, we try to understand the motivations of 
the incumbent firm (called first mover) to implement cumulative innovation in order to maintain its 
position in spite of the investments of entering firms (called follower).  
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INTRODUCTION 
Competing by innovation is most of the time studied in 
literature through the concept of “timing of 
innovation”. For a long time, analyzing this notion has 
required the mobilization of Theoretical and empirical 
models.  Reinganum (1989) proposed a classification 
with two categories of models: models of patent races 
and auction models. With the first models, there is 
always a mechanism protecting the innovation which 
promotes research activity (i.e. with a possibility of 
failure, and a possibility of requiring more 
expenditure and time than planned). In contrast, with 
the second model, result of Research and Development 
depends not only on the Investment effort which 
promotes the development activity, but also on a lack 
of technological uncertainty. 
Research and development activities are the key 
factors to achieve an innovation. From this 
classification, we try to identify the competition for 
innovation within an industry in oligopoly. 
Considering the typology of models described 
above, there are similarities between the model of 
patent races (resp. auction models) and stochastic 
models (resp. deterministic models). In order to 
represent the competition for innovation, we can 
identify the optimal date from which the innovation 
becomes available to the consumers. According to 
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the type of models, this date is either certain or 
uncertain. In the first case, the model is deterministic, 
whereas in the second case the model is stochastic.  
The fundamental difference between these two 
types of model is based on the fact that the success 
of the investment which is converted to an innovation 
is not always guaranteed. In deterministic models, 
the relation between the amount invested in R & D 
and the date of success of the innovation is fixed. In 
other words, the greater the effort in R&D, the 
nearer the date of success of the innovation.  
This is due to the decreasing functional relationship 
between both variables. In contrast, in stochastic 
models the relation between the amount invested in R 
& D and the date of successful innovation is random 
or probabilistic. In this case, the date of success is a 
random variable whose distribution depends on the 
R&D effort. Thus, the firm whose investment is the 
most important has a higher expectation of date of 
discovery. In both types of models, we consider in 
general, that the first firm which obtains innovation is 
considered as the winner. By focusing our study on 
deterministic models, the first aim of this paper is to 
identify the determinants of positioning strategy in 
the telecommunications’ industry in Senegal, which 
has undergoes a recent liberalization. 
In fact, during a long time, the growth of developing 
countries had been devoted to the development of 
three types of main industries: iron and steel industry 
(in order to cope with great needs of industrial 
equipments) and agriculture and health sectors (for 
satisfying their vital needs).  
In Senegal, agriculture, fishing and phosphates' 1 
industry had been for a long time the nerve center of 
the economy and had made it possible for the 
country to rise itself among the bests economies  in 
Western Africa. But, more recently, with the 
perpetual decline of the fishing industry due in 
particular to the massive arrivals of large European 
and Asian fishing boats which come to seek fish in 
West Africa, the sector of tourism as promotes by 
APIX2 plays also the role of the driving sector of the 
economy. So, it is only at the end of the nineties, then 
at the beginning of the year thousands that 
Senegalese authorities started to be aware of the 
importance of the telecommunication sector in the 
                                         
1 9th world phosphate producer  
2 APIX : Agence National Chargée de la Promotion des 
Investissements et des Grands Travaux : 
www.investinsenegal.com 
 
economical development, then start taking 
supporting initiatives to that sector. The most 
important of them was the liberalization of the sector 
in order to “boost” its growth and develop its 
correlative activities. Indeed, under the impulse of its 
push coming from western countries and the internal 
needs of the population, the networks’ industry, and 
mainly the telecommunications’, has become essential 
for an ascending and perpetual economic growth. 
Nowadays, the use of cell phones has spread 
extraordinarily, and subsequently leads to a 
development of innovative services adjusted to a 
rural context. 
With deterministic models, there is no uncertainty 
and the concept of the commercial value of 
innovation will be introduced. This concept is defined 
as the highest bid that the firm is ready to offer for 
obtaining innovation.  
The choice of focusing this research on the 
deterministic models is based on analytical 
considerations, meaning that the industrial 
application suggested according to the theoretical 
results obtained, depends only on the strategic 
position of a firm in accordance with the reaction of 
rival firms .Thus, the second aim of our article is to 
analyze the precarious or perennial position of the 
first firm that acquires innovation. In other words, we 
try to understand whether the company which is 
acquiring the innovation (the first mover) strengthens 
its leading position in time compared to the potential 
entering firm (follower), or if the latter can 
establishes a strategy of direct competition with the 
innovative firm. Answering to this question leads to 
identify the optimal date to introduce innovation in 
case of symmetrical firms, then in case of asymmetric 
firms. This distinction is related to the fact that if firms 
are symmetric, each is rewarded according to effort 
in R & D, whereas in other cases, firms are 
differentiated by their efficiencies in producing, and 
encouraging innovation is highlighted by the 
replacement effect (Arrow, 1962).In this context, the 
incentive of the firm to innovate is directly linked to 
the cost of R & D. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
provides an analysis of the relationship between the 
case of symmetric firms and the case of asymmetric 
firms. Section 2 presents an interpretation of the case 
of telecommunications industry in Senegal. Section 3 
concludes. 
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1. INTER-FIRM RELATIONS IN 
DETERMINISTIC MODELS 
 
There is no uncertainty in the analysis of deterministic 
models and firms’ strategies is to adopt quickly the 
innovation in order to maximize their profits (Jensen, 
2001). Then, the question is to know which criteria 
enable to distinguish the firms most encouraged to 
invest in R & D? To answer to this question, a 
distinction is made between the case of symmetric 
firms and the case of asymmetric firms. 
 
1.1. Case of symmetric firms 
Generally, in this case, competition is formulized like 
a game in which, the availability date of the 
innovation depends on the degree of investment 
(Loury, 1979, Lee and Wilde, 1980; Beath, and 
Katsoulakos Ulph, 1989). In these circumstances, we 
try to know if there is at least a firm which is willing 
to pay an effort in R & D higher than its rival firm’s 
efforts, in order to obtain innovation. Usually, this 
effort is called the “commercial value of innovation” 
(Reinganum, 1989). As deterministic models have the 
same criteria as the models of bidding, therefore the 
commercial value of the innovation is an exogenous 
parameter defined as the maximum bidding that a 
firm is laid out to pay in order to obtain the 
innovation. 
In order to present the case of symmetric firms, we 
take into account the Scherer’s basic assumptions 
(1967) to justify the relationship between the date 
of innovation and the amount of investment. In a 
context of symmetric duopoly, the probability of 
achieving innovation is identical for each firm. 
Considering that at date 0 the firm invests in R & D 
an amount noted by x , it can get an innovation at 
the date t ( 0)t ! . In this case, the deterministic 
relation between x  and t is: ( )t T x=  with ( )T x  the 
date on which the innovation is available.  
The basic assumptions of the function are the 
followings: 
i) '( ) 0T x < ; ii) ''( ) 0T x ! ; iii) 
0
lim ( )
x
T x
!
="  et 
lim ( ) 0
x
T x
!"
= ; iv) '
0
lim ( )
x
T x
!
= "#  et 'lim ( ) 0
x
T x
!"
=
.with. 
Moreover, so that the function t(x) be deterministic, 
the four previous assumptions must be verified. The 
first assumption means that the higher the amount of 
R & D, the closer the expected date of innovation.  
Thus the relationship between ( )T x  and x  is 
decreasing. The second assumption means that an 
increase of x  leads to a decrease of the date of 
obtaining innovation less than proportional. The third 
and fourth hypotheses are related to the existence 
of diminishing returns between ( )T x  and x . This 
means that since there is no investment expenditure, 
it is impossible to obtain an innovation in finite 
horizon ( )'
0 0
lim ;lim ( )
x x
T x
! !
= " = #" . Meanwhile, in the 
presence of infinite capital expenditure the 
innovation is obtained. 
The assumptions on ( )T x  lead to focus on the form 
taken by the cost of expenditure on R & D. This cost 
is either fixed (Kamien and Schwartz, 1974) or 
variable (Scherer, 1967). In the first case, the 
relationship between the cost of R & D, noted C , 
and the expected date of obtaining innovation is an 
inverse relationship: 1
1
( ) ( )
( )
C t T t
T t
!
= = . The 
previous assumptions lead to establish a direct 
relationship between the form taken by fixed cost of 
R & D and the date to which innovation becomes 
available. Assumption i) leads to assumption i ') 
1
'( ) 0
'( )
C t
T t
= < . Hypothesis ii) becomes hypothesis 
ii ')
 
''
''
3
'
( )
( ) 0.
( )
T x
C t
T x
= !
" #$ %
 Assumption iii) becomes iii 
')
 0
lim ( )
t
C t
!
="  and lim ( ) 0
t
C t
!"
= . 
From these different hypotheses, we notice that the 
fixed cost of R & D and the date to which the 
innovation becomes available take, an identical 
form. 
In the second situation, the cost of R & D is variable, 
i.e. measured in terms of flows of expenditure 
incurred until the date of innovation. Considering that 
the flow of expenditure is measured from the date 0 
until t on which the innovation is available, therefore 
the function of the flow of expenditure at 
[ ]( )0, t! ! "  is given by ( , )x t!= . This function is 
decreasing 0
x
t
!" #
<$ %
!& '
 and concave 
2
2
0 .
x
t
! "#
>$ %#& '
In 
these circumstances, Scherer (1967) demonstrates 
that if the discount rate is denoted by r , the function 
of expenditure flow between 0 and t, is 
0
( ) ( , )
t
rt
C t x t e d! !"= # . 
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Deterministic assumptions allow considering that 
when firms are symmetric within a duopoly case, 
there is at least one firm which invests more than its 
rival company, then gets the innovation. At this stage, 
the “winner takes all” mechanism is created and one 
of the firms obtains a positive income whereas the 
rival firm gets zero profit. Generally, when 
competition between symmetric firms is formalized as 
a game or tournament without iteration, a 
noncooperative equilibrium will be obtained 
(Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Reinganum, 1989). 
Obtaining a noncooperative balance in a 
competition for innovation leads to a phenomenon 
called "rent dissipation" (Encaoua and Hollander, 
2002; Encaoua and Ulph, 2004). This means that the 
winner gets innovation at a price such as the net 
present value is equal to zero. Consequently, the 
price at which the winner gets innovation prevents it 
absorbing all the available rent. 
 
1.2. Cases of asymmetric firm 
In the previous case within which firms are symmetric, 
the probability of obtaining innovation is the same 
for all firms and the commercial value of innovation 
was regarded as exogenous. In this paragraph, 
these two hypotheses are put aloof and now we 
consider the firms as asymmetric. A simple way to 
define an asymmetric firm is to consider that the unit 
production cost before innovation are not identical 
and that the commercial value of innovation depends 
on costs structure after innovation (Boone, 2001). In 
this context, firms are asymmetric in terms of 
production costs. To represent the case of asymmetric 
firms, a competition with incumbent firm and a 
potential entrant is proposed. The question is to know 
which firm has the most significant incentive to 
introduce innovation. We attempt to determine the 
most important incentive to innovate between the 
most efficient firm, i.e. the firm to which production 
cost before innovation is lower; and the less efficient 
firm, i.e. the company to which the cost of production 
before innovation is higher.  
Indeed, the most important incentive to innovate 
between firms leads to determine the identity of the 
firm which is willing to pay the commercial value of 
innovation. To determine the identity of this firm, we 
introduce the intensity of competition and take into 
account the model of Boone (2001) for justifying that 
the incentives to innovate between firms leads to 
obtain the commercial value of innovation. 
In the considered case, firms’ marginal production 
costs are different and noted by 
i
c  ( )1,2i =  with 
1 2
c c< . Without uncertainty in the market, the cost of 
innovation, noted by 
0
c , allows to diminish the firms’ 
production costs: from 
1
c  to 
0
c for firm 1 and from 
2
c  
to 
0
c
 
for firm 2. Profits of each firm depend on the 
costs of production before innovation and competing 
intensity denoted by .!  This relation is represented 
by ( ),c! " . From these parameters, we can 
determine the firm which is ready to offer the highest 
commercial value of innovation for obtaining 
innovation with a cost 
0
c . For this perspective, we 
simply present the results of the model based on the 
assumptions proposed by Boone (2001). 
We consider two competitive3 firms for a product 
such as firm 1 is more efficient than firm 2. As 
production cost after obtaining innovation is noted 
0
c , we have the following relation: 
0 1 2
c c c< <
. Moreover, Boone (2001) considers that there is 
necessarily one of the firms which obtains innovation. 
Respectively, the willingness for firm 1 and firm 2 to 
pay innovation is given by:
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 0 2 1 0, , , ,    (1)c c c c! " ! " ! "# = $  and 
( ) ( ) ( )2 0 1 2 0, , , ,    (2)c c c c! " ! " ! "# = $ . 
The comparison between equations (1) and (2) 
determines the most important incentive to 
innovate. Boone (2001) demonstrates that in case of 
situation in which there are only two active firms for 
innovating, the identity of the winner depends on the 
intensity of competition. For a low intensity of 
competition ( )! ! "=
 
and a high intensity of 
competition ( )! ! += , the identity of the firm which is 
willing to pay the commercial value of innovation is 
not the same. In this way, two types of situations 
arise: Firstly if ! ! +> , the most efficient firm has an 
incentive to innovate higher than the less efficient 
firm.  Secondly, if ! ! "< , the less efficient firm is 
more incentive to innovate than the most efficient 
firm. In this latter case, firm 2 acquires innovation 
and the leadership position of firm 1 may suffer 
from it. Therefore, there is a direct competition 
between the two firms. However, for both firms, the 
                                         
3 Competition is considered to be dynamics in the sens that the 
reaction of the rival firm depends on the action of the first 
mover firm (Leiblein and Madsen, 2009). 
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incentives to innovate cannot be compared though if 
! ! !" +< < . 
The model of Boone (2001) shows that in the case of 
asymmetric duopoly, identity of the most incited firm 
to innovate depends on the value taken by the 
intensity of competition. This intensity is estimated 
either shorter than the smallest value, or beyond the 
highest value characterizing the intensity of the 
competition. Moreover, this model shows that with an 
advantage for the most efficient firm to produce, an 
increase in the intensity of competition beyond the 
threshold of the maximum competing intensity 
considered, leads to the rise of the profit of this firm. 
Consequently, the most efficient firm has a 
competitive advantage over the less efficient firm. 
Taking into account the previous model, an 
interpretation with the telecommunications industry in 
Senegal can be proposed. 
 
2. INTERPRETATION: THE CASE OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY IN 
SENEGAL 
 
2.1. Evolution of the industry 
The telecommunications industry in Senegal is an 
oligopolistic industry characterized by the presence 
of three firms on the market: The National 
Telecommunications Company of Senegal (Sonatel) 
with the label "Orange", Sentel under the brand 
"Tigo" and Expresso using the brand Sudatel. 
Created in 1985 through the merger of the Post 
Office and Telecommunications and TeleSenegal, 
Sonatel’s group is the incumbent in 
telecommunications sector. Becoming a limited 
company in 1997 by its alliance with France Telecom 
which holds 42.33% of asset, Sonatel has taken 
advantage of its monopoly position to establish and 
develop a large telephony network before the 
opening of the market to competition. Today, France 
Telecom’s brand tends to become the name of the 
group (Orange).  
After the privatization of Sonatel in 1997, the 
willingness of the Senegalese government was to 
open the telecommunications sector toward 
competition. In 1999, the group Millicom 
International Cellular (MIC) became the second 
operator of senegalese mobile. MIC, represented 
under the brand SENTEL, holds 75% of its 
subsidiary's assets. At the beginning of its activities, 
SENTEL was more known under the trademark 
"Hello". But, with great a concern for innovation and 
the industry dynamics, the brand "Hello" was 
replaced by "Tigo" in 2005. Since that period, the 
group's policy consists in innovating and diversifying 
its offers in order to respond to the increasing 
consumers demand.  
While still remaining in the dynamics of the market's 
opening to competition, a third operating license was 
attributed in 2007 to the Sudanese Company of 
Telephony: SUDATEL.  The company’s brand is 
"Expresso Senegal." Since the starting of its activities 
in 2009, Sudatel tempts to fill the gap separating it 
from the two previous operators by providing 
massive contributions in terms of innovation. In that 
way, the company has proposed for the first time in 
Senegal, a new standard for third generation phone, 
which by definition is based on UMTS (Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications Systems). This represents 
an absolute break with the GSM (Global System for 
Mobile communication). 
 
2.2. Positioning strategies 
Positioning strategies illustrated in this paragraph 
are based on the results obtained from the model 
presented by Boone (2001). We are highlighting a 
comparison between each operator's offers by 
considering only the situation in which firms are 
asymmetric because of variation in the investment 
capacities which exist between the incumbent and 
entering firms. With this intention, we confront the 
market share between Orange, Tigo and Expresso 
by taking into account the investment strategies. This 
makes it possible to consider cost difference of 
production existing between the most efficient firm 
(incumbent) and the less efficient company or firms. 
In terms of innovation incentive, the crucial point of 
positioning strategy which we are dealing with in this 
paper, consists in verifying the "replacement effect" 
between the incumbent and entering firms. 
Explanations relative to this question leads to 
consider the market segments on which each 
operator is present, then to apprehend the 
diversification of the products offered in terms of 
innovation. Thus, the question is why firm diversify 
their products taking into account the rival firms 
products?  
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Generally, the different market segments on which 
operate industrial sector of telecommunications are: 
mobile telephony, fixed telephony, the Internet 
access services using conventional lines (ADSL) and 
the cellular connection to the Internet (WAP). The 
distribution of these different market segments 
presented in 1 let notice a double observation. 
Firstly, the incumbent (Sonatel) is present on all 
market segments and offers in addition to 
traditional services, various innovative services 
which are beyond the operation of the 
telecommunications market. The reason of this fact is 
in particular, the advantage acquired before the 
opening of the market to competition. Secondly, the 
last entrant, Expresso Senegal, is also present on all 
market segments. This is due to the fact that, 
contrary to SENTEL, SUDATEL has mobilized a 
significant investment in order to promote his 
label. Moreover, it is the only operator equipped 
with a third-generation license (3G). However, 
owing to economic issues in this market segment, the 
tendency is towards a change in competitors’ 
strategies. Undoubtedly, that SUDATEL to keep a 
length in advance compared to the incumbent on 
the next-generation technologies. 
Concerning the offers proposed in the market by 
the three firms, there is permanently an aggressive 
promotion policy. For instance, with prepaid cards, 
Orange offers regularly promotions which exceed 
50% Orange on all recharging cards. As for 
Expresso, it offers 100% bonus and Tigo proposes 
unlimited calls to favorite numbers and/or reduces 
price for calls towards customers within the TIGO 
network. These promotional offers allow each 
operator to advocate its brand image through a 
marketing policy closer to consumers needs. 
From the standpoint of positioning strategies of the 
different firms, Orange still leads a length with 
regard to its competitors in market segments where 
demand is greatest, mainly, mobile telephony and 
home Internet access. 
Thus, the replacement effect principle demonstrated 
in the previous section is not verified in cumulative 
innovation industries such as telecommunications’. In 
other words, when innovation is the only competitive 
factor which differentiates competing firms, the 
incumbent firm has a greater incentive to innovate 
than potential entrants. This is illustrated by Figure 
1 from 2007 to 2009. 
On the basis of market shares, Orange Mobile has 
at its disposal a significant advance towards its 
rivals. In this way, at the end of 2009, the market 
shares of Orange Mobile and Tigo were 
respectively 67% and 32%. As well, since the 
release of its services, Expresso launches itself 
slightly into the market shares conquest. However, 
there is presently a higher intensity of 
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competition. The dynamics in the market shares' 
evolution shows that even if Tigo showed an 
increase of its Market shares between 2008 (26%) 
and 2009 (32%), we notice yet an increase in 
Orange Mobile's market shares due to massive 
arrival of new customers.Consequently, competition 
is characterized by a high level because of the 
aggressive promotion policies with services 
innovations increasingly important. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
According to deterministic models, competition 
between firms is either symmetrical or 
asymmetrical. The first case expresses a non 
cooperative equilibrium which leads to the 
dissipation of the firms’ innovative rent. Investment 
strategies of firms are independent and there is 
inevitably at least one firm which acquires 
innovation. In these conditions, the innovative firm 
(first mover) gains an advantage over the follower 
firm. Therefore, even if firms have equal 
opportunity for acquiring innovation, the innovative 
firm tends to reinforce its leading position. In 
contrast, when firms are asymmetric, there is initially 
a competitive advantage for at least one of the 
firms. In this case, when firms are differentiated by 
production costs before the innovation, and that the 
competing intensity is taken into account, the most 
efficient firm strengthens its leading position when a 
certain high level of competition is reached. The 
first mover firm has a higher incentive to innovate. 
The outcome of this case in the Senegalese 
telecommunications industry brings to light that the 
incumbent (Sonatel) retains its leading position 
despite investment efforts of competing firms. 
Conversely, when the level of competition is low, the 
less efficient firm has a higher incentive to acquire 
innovation. In this case, there is a direct competition 
between the follower and the incumbent firm. 
Moreover, the interpretation of Boone’s model in 
the case of Senegalese telecommunications industry 
stresses also that the negative relationship between 
effort in R & D and the date of obtaining the 
innovation is verified. Indeed, only the innovating 
firm has the benefits of almost all of the outputs of 
the innovation. 
Thus, the catch up mechanism is late or absent. In 
order to overcome this constraint and thus promote 
competition, Stewart (1983) proposed a model with 
which the hypothesis of "winner takes all profit" is 
released, but the negative relation between effort 
in R & D and the date of obtaining an innovation 
remains maintained. Taking into account cumulative 
innovations enables to illustrate this scenario. 
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